USA v. Cosme Ordaz by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-2-2016 
USA v. Cosme Ordaz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Cosme Ordaz" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 434. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/434 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
DLD-182        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-3547 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
COSME ORDAZ, 
        Appellant 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 98-cr-00587-16) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 17, 2016 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER1, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 2, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
1 The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter participated in the decision in this case.  Judge 
Sloviter assumed inactive status on April 4, 2016 after the submission date, but before the 
filing of the opinion.  This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12. 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Cosme Ordaz appeals from an order of the District Court granting, but only in  
part, his motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 
 In 1998, Ordaz was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and use of a telephone in furtherance of a drug conspiracy, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).  Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on 
both counts.  Ordaz was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 360 months.  We 
affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing in light 
of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  See United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 
236 (3d Cir.2005).  On remand, Ordaz was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 298 
months.  In calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the sentencing court found that 
Ordaz’s criminal activity involved between 5 and 15 kilograms of cocaine, which 
produced a base offense level of 32.  Additionally, the court assessed a 3-level 
enhancement for his managerial role in the conspiracy, bringing his offense level up to 
35.  With a category VI criminal history, Ordaz’s resulting Guidelines range was 292 - 
365 months.  His actual sentence of 298 months thus was 6 months above the lower end 
of that range.  We affirmed the new sentence.  See United States v. Ordaz, 227 F. App’x 
170 (3d Cir. 2007).  Ordaz then unsuccessfully pursued relief from his conviction and 
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
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 On April 29, 2015, Ordaz filed a motion to reduce his sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2), pursuant to Amendment 782.  Specifically, Ordaz sought a 2-level reduction 
in his offense level from 35 to 33.  The Federal Public Defender was appointed to 
represent Ordaz and communications with the Government then ensued.  The 
Government evidently advised counsel that Ordaz was entitled to only a 1-level reduction 
in his offense level, from 35 to 34, because he was a career offender.  The District Court 
eventually granted Ordaz’s motion, but only to the extent of a 1-level reduction in his 
offense level from 35 to 34.  The Court imposed a new sentence of 268 months’ 
imprisonment, thus retaining the sentencing judge’s determination to assign a length of 
incarceration that was 6 months above the lower end of the Guidelines range.   
 Ordaz filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, in which he argued that the 
sentencing court never specifically found that he was a career offender, and that the 
finding in the Presentence Report was insufficient to establish career offender status 
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  The Government, pursuant to the District Court’s order, 
submitted a response to the reconsideration motion, and argued that Ordaz was wrong on 
both counts.  The Government argued that, because Ordaz was a career offender, any 
reduction in his sentence was capped at an offense level of 34.  The Government asserted 
and documented that the transcript of the resentencing hearing showed that there were no 
objections to the facts in the Presentence Report, and that Ordaz had lodged no objections 
to the findings in the Presentence Report, including the criminal history calculation and 
the finding that his criminal record classified him as a career offender.  The Government 
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argued that Ordaz’s failure to object to the facts and conclusions in the Presentence 
Report constituted an admission of those facts and conclusions. 
 In an order entered on December 11, 2015, the District Court agreed with the 
Government’s position and denied Ordaz’s motion for reconsideration.  The Court 
explained that Ordaz was a career offender, citing ¶ 116 of the Presentence Report, and 
that his status as a career offender would have dictated an offense level of 34 had the 
sentencing court not applied the higher offense level of 35 from § 2D1.2.  Amendment 
782 lowers offense levels by 2 as a general matter, but Ordaz’s career offender status 
would cap his sentence reduction at level 34, not level 33.  The Court found support for 
capping the 2-level reduction pursuant to a defendant’s career offender status in United 
States v. Tellis, 748 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2014) (reducing defendant’s offense level from 
38 to 37 where reduction would have reduced offense level to 36 were it not capped by 
application of § 4B.1 at an offense level of 37), and noted that, under our precedent, 
Amendment 782 does not apply to the § 4B1.1 career offender designation, see United 
States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (career offender who received no 
downward departures and was sentenced within the career offender Guidelines range was 
not eligible for reduction in sentence even though his base offense level had been 
subsequently lowered by Amendment 706). 
 Ordaz appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk advised 
him that the appeal was subject to summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6.  Ordaz has submitted a summary action response, in which he has repeated the 
arguments he made in his motion for reconsideration.  Specifically, he argues that 
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because he was not, in fact, sentenced under the career offender Guidelines, his offense 
level should have been set by the District Court at 33, not 34.  Furthermore, he argues, 
the District Court should have taken into consideration his misconduct-free prison history 
in reducing his sentence.  With respect to the latter argument, Ordaz asserts that he has 
served 202 months in prison without ever having been charged with a misconduct. 
 We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  The 
District Court’s ultimate decision to deny a § 3582(c)(2) motion is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion, but we review de novo the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.   
See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154.  A District Court generally cannot modify a term of 
imprisonment once it has been imposed.  Section 3582(c)(2) provides an exception “in 
the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a 
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”   
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The applicable policy statement instructs that any reduction in 
sentence is not consistent with the policy statement and therefore not authorized by 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if an amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the 
defendant’s applicable guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); United States v. 
Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 2013).   
 Here, it is undisputed that Amendment 782 lowered Ordaz’s applicable Guidelines 
range by at least 1 level.  But there also is no genuine dispute here that the Presentence 
Report identified Ordaz as a career offender, and that, at his resentencing on August 12, 
2005, the sentencing court specifically asked his counsel whether he had any objections 
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to the facts in the Presentence Report; counsel responded in the negative.  A defendant 
who fails to object to facts asserted in the Presentence Report is deemed to have admitted 
those facts.  See United States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 2007).  See also United 
States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (“A conclusion in the 
presentence investigation report which goes unchallenged by the defendant is, of course, 
a proper basis for sentence determination.”).  Ordaz’s sentence reduction is thus capped 
at level 34, for the reasons given by the District Court; the corresponding Guidelines 
range is 262-327 months, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(2).2   
 In addition, the District Court was not authorized to take into consideration the 
factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Section 1B1.10(b)(2) confines the extent of the 
reduction authorized in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.  Courts may not reduce a defendant’s 
term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(2) to a term that is less than the minimum of the 
amended Guidelines range produced by the substitution, unless the sentencing court 
originally imposed a term of imprisonment below the Guidelines range, Dillon v. United 
States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010).  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the orders of the District 
Court to the extent that the Court denied Ordaz a 2-level adjustment. 
                                              
2 Under § 4B1.1, an offense level of 34 applies where the statutory maximum penalty is 
less than life but exceeds 25 years.  Ordaz’s statutory maximum sentence was 30 years. 
